dc.contributor.advisor |
MacArthur, J |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Lin, Chin-Hung |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2017-05-08T02:46:21Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2016 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/32804 |
en |
dc.description |
Full text is available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland only. |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
This thesis examines the domestic politics of tax competition in New Zealand and the implications for international tax governance. International tax avoidance and evasion are detrimental to state and global welfare, and their distributive effects create significant political instability. The persistence of tax havens and absence of an effective tax regime warrants further exploration. Existing academic contributions are dominated by economic and legal scholarship. These largely assume tax havens benefit from tax competition, using rationalistic explanations at the state-state level. This thesis examines the economic and distributive effects of tax competition within New Zealand, alongside the operation of competition norms and private actors that constrain both domestic policy and multilateral cooperation. Tax havens exercise considerable agency in international taxation, despite their small economic and military size. Therefore, the effectiveness of an international tax regime depends not only on the commitment of resources from great powers, but on voluntary compliance from tax havens. New Zealand is chosen as a case study. This is because following New Zealand’s implication in the Panama Papers in 2016, its role as a tax-haven remained under-analysed. This research draws on quantitative and qualitative sources, including economic data from the OECD, attitudinal data from International Social Survey Programme, and consultation documents from the Tax Review 2001 and the Government Inquiry into Foreign Trust Disclosure Rules 2016. The economic data suggests that New Zealand, especially in terms of productivity and economic growth, has not benefitted from competitive taxation. In some instances, tax competition actually exacerbated inequalities. Despite this, the 2001 review under the fifth Labour government shows the operation of competitiveness norms can be internalised by an ostensibly left-wing government and elevate the power of private actors. The 2016 Inquiry after the Panama Papers also saw a dominance of financial interests, although a shift away from competitiveness to privacy norms. However, the fifth National government has since committed to reform, demonstrating it is possible with changing norms and organisational dynamics, in a post-Global Financial Crisis era. |
en |
dc.publisher |
ResearchSpace@Auckland |
en |
dc.relation.ispartof |
Masters Thesis - University of Auckland |
en |
dc.relation.isreferencedby |
UoA99264922011602091 |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. |
en |
dc.rights |
Restricted Item. Available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland. |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/nz/ |
en |
dc.title |
From Panama to Papatoetoe: The Politics of Tax Competition in New Zealand |
en |
dc.type |
Thesis |
en |
thesis.degree.discipline |
Politics and International Relations |
en |
thesis.degree.grantor |
The University of Auckland |
en |
thesis.degree.level |
Masters |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: The author |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
624589 |
en |
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2017-05-08 |
en |
dc.identifier.wikidata |
Q112925835 |
|