Intertemporal preferences of individual and collective decision-makers

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dc.contributor.advisor Ryan, M en
dc.contributor.advisor Galbraith, S en
dc.contributor.author Anchugina, Nina en
dc.date.accessioned 2017-05-15T03:10:09Z en
dc.date.issued 2017 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/32901 en
dc.description.abstract This thesis contributes to theoretical modelling of time preferences of individual and collective decision-makers. In the context of an individual decision-maker we study two problems: axiomatization of time preferences and the effect of delay on the ranking of sequences of dated outcomes. In the context of a group of decision-makers we investigate the problem of aggregation of time preferences. First, we provide a new axiomatic foundation for exponential, quasi-hyperbolic and semi-hyperbolic discounting when preferences are expressed over streams of consumption lotteries. The key advantage of our axiomatic system is its simplicity and its use of a common framework for finite and infinite time horizons. Second, we analyse preferences with the property that the ranking of two sequences of dated outcomes can switch from one strict ranking to the opposite at most once as a function of some common delay -- the "one-switch" property of Bell [12]. We demonstrate that time preferences satisfy the one-switch property if and only if the discount function is either the sum of exponentials or linear times exponential. This is a revision of Bell's result [12], who claimed that the only discount functions compatible with the one-switch property are sums of exponentials. We also show that linear times exponential discount functions exhibit increasing impatience in the sense of Takeuchi [77]. To the best of our knowledge, linear times exponential discount functions have not been used in the context of time preference before. Finally, we study the problem of aggregating time preferences when individual time preferences exhibit decreasing impatience. If decision-makers have the same level of decreasing impatience, our result proves that the aggregate discount function is strictly more decreasingly impatient than each of individual discount functions. This is a generalization of Prelec's and Jackson and Yariv's results on the aggregation of discount functions [46, 63]. We also analyse the situation in which the aggregation problem arises because of some uncertainty about the discount function. In this context we prove the analogue of Weitzman's influential result [81], showing that if a decision-maker is uncertain about her hyperbolic discount rate, then long-term costs and benefits will be discounted at a hyperbolic discount rate which is the probability-weighted harmonic mean of the possible hyperbolic discount rates. en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartof PhD Thesis - University of Auckland en
dc.relation.isreferencedby UoA99264980605102091 en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/nz/ en
dc.title Intertemporal preferences of individual and collective decision-makers en
dc.type Thesis en
thesis.degree.discipline Mathematics en
thesis.degree.grantor The University of Auckland en
thesis.degree.level Doctoral en
thesis.degree.name PhD en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess en
pubs.elements-id 625720 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2017-05-15 en


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