Abstract:
Our participation with works of fiction involves the emotions. Just what this involvement
amounts to is a question of great interest. I argue that the literature on the involvement of the
emotions in fictive practice has usually made several mistakes. Firstly it has assumed that the
emotions are better understood than they actually are. I argue that the theory of emotions
common to most of the theories of fiction and the emotion is far from controversial. Revising our
conception on what emotions are may allow us to revise our conception of the nature of our
emotional involvement in fiction. Second, I argue that two forms of problem are often conflated
when philosophers discuss fictional and the emotions. There are semantic and ontological
problems, and substantive psychological problems. Often these problems are confused for each
other. Distinguishing between the two forms of problem will help to clear up the significant
disagreements that exist in the literature. My thesis is broadly naturalised in intent, in the hope
that this focus will be productive in explaining the role of the emotions in fictive practice.