dc.contributor.author |
Brock, Gillian |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2017-07-30T21:55:42Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2016 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
Law, Ethics and Philosophy 4:161-182 2016 |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
2341-1465 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/34581 |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
In this paper I respond to important concerns about the policies I believe poor developing states may be permitted to use in responding to losses associated with high skill migration, when those losses do indeed exist. I take up Joseph Carens’s invitation to broaden the debate to consider the moral duties we may have surrounding the brain drain debate, given our unjust world. In response to Eszter Kollar, I show why the liberal state may sometimes justifiably control how citizens use their talents, especially in insisting that they use them to reduce compatriots’ neediness. I consider Kieran Oberman’s challenge that proper consideration of the human right to emigrate blocks the state’s ability to use programs such as compulsory service ones. I reply to Hillel Rapoport’s presentation of empirical evidence suggesting that there are important gains to be secured from high skill migration. I show why the empirical evidence presented is insufficient to make the relevant case. I also show why none of the challenges presented are sufficient to block the normative project of investigating how poor developing states may permissibly respond to losses associated with high skill migration. In particular, I argue that carefully crafted compulsory service and taxation programs may permissibly be used by such states under certain conditions. |
en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Law, Ethics and Philosophy |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
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dc.title |
Responsibilities in an Unjust World: A Reply to Carens, Kollar, Oberman, and Rapoport |
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dc.type |
Journal Article |
en |
pubs.begin-page |
161 |
en |
pubs.volume |
4 |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
en |
pubs.end-page |
182 |
en |
dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess |
en |
pubs.subtype |
Discussion Paper |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
612568 |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Arts |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Humanities |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Philosophy |
en |
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2017-02-14 |
en |