Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals

Show simple item record Hillas, John en Liu, M en 2017-09-07T23:53:33Z en 2016-03 en
dc.identifier.citation International Journal of Game Theory 45(1-2):137-153 Mar 2016 en
dc.identifier.issn 0020-7276 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract In this work we extend a result of Lehrer (Math Oper Res 17(1):175–199, 1992a) characterising the correlated equilibrium payoffs in undiscounted two player repeated games with partial monitoring to the case in which the signals are permitted to be stochastic. In particular, we develop appropriate versions of Lehrer’s concepts of “indistinguishable” and “more informative.” We also show that any individually rational payoff associated with a (correlated) distribution on pure action profiles in the stage game such that neither player can profitably deviate from one of his actions to another that is indistinguishable and more informative is the payoff of a correlated equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. en
dc.publisher Physica-Verlag en
dc.relation.ispartofseries International Journal of Game Theory en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s00182-015-0495-5 en
pubs.issue 1-2 en
pubs.begin-page 137 en
pubs.volume 45 en
dc.description.version AM - Accepted Manuscript en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: Springer-Verlag en
pubs.end-page 153 en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 23512 en Business and Economics en Economics en
dc.identifier.eissn 1432-1270 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2019-05-28 en

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