Abstract:
This thesis deals with response-dependence accounts of concepts - concepts the
extensions of which are determined by our responses under certain conditions - and
the possibility of realist construals of practices involving such concepts. Drawing
attention to distinctions between different types of response-dependent concepts,
Chapter I proposes an account of response-dependence that recognises a variegation
of types of concept that can plausibly be identified as response-dependent. Chapter II
continues the development of this account by considering matters relevant to the form
and content of the biconditional theorems (basic equations) of which responsedependence
accounts are comprised.
The account I propose in these first two chapters attempts to abstract from the details
of existing accounts. Nevertheless, the middle section of the thesis – Chapters III, IV,
V and VI – provide critical exegeses of response-dependence accounts developed by
three authors – Mark Johnston’s Response-Dispositionalism, Philip Pettit’s Global
Response-Dependence account of basic concepts and Crispin Wright’s Order of
Determination distinction - accounts that have been fundamental to and influential in
the literature on response dependence.
Consideration of Crispin Wright’s realism relevant distinctions provides a bridge to
Chapter VII where I undertake a detailed analysis of realism, according to which
realism is recognised as an array of commitments that are best understood as
organised within three distinctive and largely independent clusters – semantic, ontic and epistemic. Finally, in Chapter VIII we are able to effect a productive engagement
between realism, understood according to the taxonomic exercise undertaken in
Chapter VII, and response-dependence, understood according to the account
developed and promoted in Chapters I and II, an engagement that results in a more
fine-grained and sophisticated analysis of the prospects for a reconciliation of realism
and response-dependence than has yet appeared in the literature.