A comparative case study of the framing of gambling harm minimisation: the influence of public health tradition and form of casino ownership

Abstract

Background There is a lack of research examining the relationship between public health traditions, public ownership over casino gambling, and the realisation of a public health approach towards gambling harm minimisation. This study explored the framing of gambling harm minimisation in two jurisdictions. The first jurisdiction was New Zealand, which has a limited public health traditions and private ownership of casino gambling. The second jurisdiction was Sweden which has an extensive public health tradition and public ownership of casino gambling. Aims This study aimed to describe similarities and differences between the framings of stakeholders in each jurisdiction, and explore the extent to which a public health tradition, and form of casino ownership influences these framings. Data and methods This research utilised a comparative case study approach. The ‘case’ for comparison was the framing of casino gambling harm minimisation by stakeholders in each jurisdiction. Data sources consisted of interviews with stakeholders, and key documents of their organisations. A framing matrix was used to analyse key aspects of the stakeholder frames. These framings were then compared between countries to identify similarities and differences. Results The industry stakeholders in both countries expressed a predominantly individualised framing of the issue. The government and non-government stakeholder groups in both countries articulated both individualised and public health frames. Predominantly, all stakeholder groups in each country, conveyed individualised framings of the issue. Conclusion Stakeholder groups in Sweden did not articulate a stronger public health framing of the issue, implying that an extensive public health tradition and public ownership of casino gambling, does not necessarily lead to a stronger public health framing, or approach to gambling harm minimisation. One possible explanation for this finding is that the Swedish government’s conflict of interest as owner, operator and regulator of gambling, and dependence on gambling revenue, has resulted in industry interests prevailing over public health interests. Another possible explanation was that strong industry and international influence has prevailed in the adoption of a predominantly individualised framing by all stakeholders. Based on these explanations, this study recommended building political will to introduce more upstream public health interventions, to ensure that governments uphold a duty of care towards its citizenry, reduce gambling-related harm, resolve the conflict of interest, and remove dependence on revenue generated by casino gambling.