Abstract:
The octopus is a fascinating organism which challenges common assumptions regarding the correlation between the nervous system and the mind, especially with regards to the structures of cognition and consciousness. The cognitive and behavioural capacities of octopuses are highly sophisticated and similar to those of many vertebrates, despite the significant anatomical and functional differences between octopus and vertebrate nervous systems. This thesis explores the implications raised by the octopus for a number of issues within the philosophies of mind, cognitive science, and neuroscience. In particular, it demonstrates that the features of the octopus nervous system are such that they preclude plausibly accounting for the animal’s psychological characteristics using the standard explanatory tools of mainstream cognitive science. While this thesis takes a theoretical approach to these issues, it also draws extensively on the findings of empirical research on octopuses from neuroscience, psychology, and biology. The investigation first focuses on cognition. Here, the discussions establish the octopus as proof for the ontological diversity of cognitive processes, and proceed to challenge the causal and epistemic frameworks that are widely received in cognitive science. The latter part of the thesis shifts its focus to consciousness. This section presupposes that consciousness exists in octopuses, in order to demonstrate that the structure and adaptive functions of consciousness can differ significantly from those attributed to it by mainstream cognitive science. The overall objective of this project is to show that cognitive science must radically depart from established, vertebrate-based models of cognition if it is to accommodate octopuses, a species-rich invertebrate genus characterized by behavioural and cognitive complexity. The broader significance of addressing the need for new models of cognition lies in expanding the explanatory scope of the cognitive and brain sciences in order to render them more effective at handling forms of intelligence that are unlike those of vertebrates.