Abstract:
In 1973–75 Gibbard and Satterthwaite published a fundamental impossibility theorem which states that every
non-dictatorial social choice function, whose range contains at least three alternatives, at certain profiles can be
manipulated by a single individual voter [6, 15]. After that, the natural question arose: if there are no perfect rules,
which ones are the best, i.e. least manipulable? To this question there can be no absolute answer – it depends both
on the behaviour of the voters, and on the measure used to quantify the term “manipulability”.
Among models of voter behaviour, the following two have gained the most attention ([3,14]). The Impartial
Culture (IC) model assumes that voters are independent, and that each voter is equally likely to vote for any
candidate. The Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) model assumes some degree of dependency. This paper concerns
itself with the IC model.
