The Logic of a Priori and a Posteriori Rationality in Strategic Games

Show simple item record Seligman, Jeremy en
dc.coverage.spatial Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China en 2018-10-02T23:09:28Z en 2013-10-11 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract We propose logic for describing the interaction between knowledge, preference, and the freedom to act, and their interactions with the norms of a priori and a posteriori rationality, which we have argued for in previous work. We then apply it to strategic games to characterise dominance and Nash equilibrium. en
dc.relation.ispartof The 4th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI 4) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title The Logic of a Priori and a Posteriori Rationality in Strategic Games en
dc.type Presentation en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en en
pubs.finish-date 2013-10-12 en
pubs.start-date 2013-10-09 en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Conference Oral Presentation en
pubs.elements-id 648950 en Arts en Humanities en Philosophy en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2017-08-15 en

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