The Logic of a Priori and a Posteriori Rationality in Strategic Games

Seligman, Jeremy

dc.contributor.author	Seligman, Jeremy	en
dc.coverage.spatial	Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China	en
dc.date.accessioned	2018-10-02T23:09:28Z	en
dc.date.issued	2013-10-11	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2292/38392	en
dc.description.abstract	We propose logic for describing the interaction between knowledge, preference, and the freedom to act, and their interactions with the norms of a priori and a posteriori rationality, which we have argued for in previous work. We then apply it to strategic games to characterise dominance and Nash equilibrium.	en
dc.relation.ispartof	The 4th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI 4)	en
dc.rights	Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.	en
dc.rights.uri	https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm	en
dc.title	The Logic of a Priori and a Posteriori Rationality in Strategic Games	en
dc.type	Presentation	en
dc.rights.holder	Copyright: The author	en
pubs.author-url	http://www.golori.org/lori2013/	en
pubs.finish-date	2013-10-12	en
pubs.start-date	2013-10-09	en
dc.rights.accessrights	http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess	en
pubs.subtype	Conference Oral Presentation	en
pubs.elements-id	648950	en
pubs.org-id	Arts	en
pubs.org-id	Humanities	en
pubs.org-id	Philosophy	en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date	2017-08-15	en