When Scientific Consensus Meets Public Scepticism: Some Insights from Social Epistemology

Abstract

Head of School’s Seminar Series, School of Population Health, University of Auckland. Why do many people reject the scientific consensus on public health issues such as climate change and the safety and efficacy of vaccines? It is tempting to think that those who reject the scientific consensus on such issues either lack the evidence that would lead them to accept the scientific view, or lack the ability to assess the evidence that is available. In this talk, I suggest that public scepticism in such cases is not due to lack of evidence or to deficits of reason; but rather that it is more likely due to the effect that social networks play in our lives as knowers and reasoners. Drawing on insights from the philosophical discipline of social epistemology, I outline a model of how we can and do (justifiably) form beliefs and judgments by deferring to what we are told by others. But I also explore some ways in which these reasoning process can go astray. In the final part of the talk, I offer some suggestions about what can be done to counteract these negative patterns of social reasoning, and, in particular, what scientists and health advocates can do to enhance the credibility of science in the public sphere.