A Generalisation of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998): Voting under ambiguity

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dc.contributor.author Pan, Siwen en
dc.contributor.author Fabrizi, S en
dc.coverage.spatial Maastricht University, The Netherlands en
dc.date.accessioned 2018-10-04T04:11:02Z en
dc.date.issued 2016-07-26 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/38882 en
dc.description.abstract The seeking of unanimous consensus in collective decision-making situations is notoriously bad due to the tendency for individuals within a group to vote strategically against their private information, especially as the size of group gets larger. In jury trials, this leads to the paradox that the more demanding the hurdle for conviction is, the more likely it is that a jury will convict an innocent defendant. We challenge these established results, by exploring voting behaviour when collective decision-making occurs based on information, the reliability of which is ambiguous. With ambiguity-averse voters, who are MaxMin Expected Utility maximizers, we demonstrate that unanimity voting is compatible with instances of informative voting, outperforming other voting rules, such as majority voting. en
dc.relation.ispartof 2016 World Congresso f the Game Theory Society en
dc.relation.ispartof 2016 World Congresso f the Game Theory Society en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.title A Generalisation of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998): Voting under ambiguity en
dc.type Presentation en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en
pubs.author-url https://project.dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl/games2016/ en
pubs.finish-date 2016-07-28 en
pubs.start-date 2016-07-24 en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess en
pubs.subtype Conference Oral Presentation en
pubs.elements-id 683661 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2017-10-05 en


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