Collective Decision-making under Ambiguity

dc.contributor.author	Pan, S	en
dc.coverage.spatial	Wellington	en
dc.date.accessioned	2018-10-04T04:16:05Z	en
dc.date.issued	2017-11-17	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2292/38884	en
dc.description.abstract	We investigate the impact of ambiguous information structure on the quality of collective decision-making, given different voting rules and non-standard Bayesian updating methods. We also study the effects of embedding ambiguous information to static, finite games of incomplete information with unmediated communication. We intend to characterize the solution concept of sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions under ambiguity. In addition, we want to test the set of equilibrium outcomes of such a game in experiments.	en
dc.relation.ispartof	Joint New Zealand and Australia Meeting of Humboldt Fellows	en
dc.rights	Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.	en
dc.rights.uri	https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm	en
dc.title	Collective Decision-making under Ambiguity	en
dc.type	Conference Poster	en
dc.rights.holder	Copyright: The author	en
pubs.author-url	https://www.humboldt.org.nz/events/	en
dc.rights.accessrights	http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess	en
pubs.elements-id	683927	en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date	2017-10-05	en

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