Collective Decision-making under Ambiguity

Show simple item record Pan, S en
dc.coverage.spatial Wellington en 2018-10-04T04:16:05Z en 2017-11-17 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract We investigate the impact of ambiguous information structure on the quality of collective decision-making, given different voting rules and non-standard Bayesian updating methods. We also study the effects of embedding ambiguous information to static, finite games of incomplete information with unmediated communication. We intend to characterize the solution concept of sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions under ambiguity. In addition, we want to test the set of equilibrium outcomes of such a game in experiments. en
dc.relation.ispartof Joint New Zealand and Australia Meeting of Humboldt Fellows en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Collective Decision-making under Ambiguity en
dc.type Conference Poster en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.elements-id 683927 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2017-10-05 en

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