Collective Deliberation Under Non-common Prior

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Show simple item record Pan, Siwen en Fabrizi, S en Lippert, S en
dc.coverage.spatial Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands en 2018-10-04T04:17:08Z en 2016-07-22 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract Relaxing the standard assumption in collective decision-making models that voters assign equal precision to the reliability of their information, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher quality decisions, including when the number of voters grows large. We obtain richer sets of voting equilibria, than for standard collective decision-making models, with many instances, also validated experimentally, in which other non-unanimous voting rules, if not even unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority. en
dc.relation.ispartof 12th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory en
dc.relation.ispartof 12th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Collective Deliberation Under Non-common Prior en
dc.type Presentation en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en en
pubs.finish-date 2016-07-22 en
pubs.start-date 2016-07-20 en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Conference Oral Presentation en
pubs.elements-id 683668 en Faculty of Business & Economic en Economics en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2017-10-05 en

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