An Economic Model of Knowledge Outsourcing

dc.contributor.author	Lee, Jaeseok	en
dc.contributor.author	Gaimon, C	en
dc.contributor.author	Ramachandran, K	en
dc.date.accessioned	2018-10-08T03:13:10Z	en
dc.date.issued	2016-11-14	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2292/39438	en
dc.description.abstract	We introduce a game-theoretic model of knowledge outsourcing. We study how the interaction between a knowledge buyer and supplier is affected by two salient aspects of knowledge outsourcing: absorptive capacity and the ability to reuse prior knowledge. We also investigate how uncertainty and information asymmetry influence the equilibrium outcomes.	en
dc.description.uri	http://meetings2.informs.org/wordpress/nashville2016/	en
dc.relation.ispartof	Informs 2016 Annual Meeting at Nashville	en
dc.rights	Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.	en
dc.rights.uri	https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm	en
dc.title	An Economic Model of Knowledge Outsourcing	en
dc.type	Presentation	en
dc.rights.holder	Copyright: The author	en
pubs.author-url	http://www.abstractsonline.com/pp8/#!/4182/session/1014	en
pubs.finish-date	2016-11-16	en
pubs.start-date	2016-11-13	en
dc.rights.accessrights	http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess	en
pubs.elements-id	689722	en
pubs.org-id	Business and Economics	en
pubs.org-id	Info Systems & Operations Mgmt	en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date	2017-10-11	en

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