Pay cuts and layoffs in an experimental minimum effort coordination game

Show simple item record Chaudhuri, Ananish en So, Tony en Sbai, Erwann en 2018-10-09T03:30:35Z en 2017-09-27 en
dc.identifier.issn 1545-2921 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract It is well-documented that during recessions, businesses prefer to lay off workers rather than implement across the board pay cuts. We examine the impact of pay cuts versus layoffs on intra-organization coordination, which is a fundamental problem facing firms involved in team production, by looking at behavior in the minimum effort coordination game following an intervention. Our results suggest that, contrary to received wisdom, both pay cuts and layoffs foster better coordination success. In particular, we do not find that pay cuts are detrimental to intraorganization coordination. en
dc.publisher Economics Bulletin en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics Bulletin en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Pay cuts and layoffs in an experimental minimum effort coordination game en
dc.type Journal Article en
pubs.issue 3 en
pubs.begin-page 2181 en
pubs.volume 37 en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The authors en en
pubs.end-page 2197 en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 680251 en Business and Economics en Economics en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2017-10-02 en 2017-09-27 en

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