A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem

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dc.contributor.author Beltran, Fernando en
dc.contributor.author Santamaria, Natalia en
dc.date.accessioned 2009-06-12T00:11:29Z en
dc.date.available 2009-06-12T00:11:29Z en
dc.date.issued 2006 en
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences 2006 (27417), 14 pages. 2006 en
dc.identifier.issn 1173-9126 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/4330 en
dc.description An open access copy of this article is available and complies with the copyright holder/publisher conditions. en
dc.description.abstract One not-so-intuitive result in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem, which states that as long as an auction complies with some conditions, it will on average generate the same revenue to an auctioneer as the revenue generated by any other auction that complies with them. Surprisingly, the conditions are not defined on the payment rules to the bidders but on the fact that the bidders do not bid below a reserve value—set by the auctioneer—the winner is the one with the highest bidding and there is a common equilibrium bidding function used by all bidders. In this paper, we verify such result using extensive simulation of a broad range of auctions and focus on the variability or fluctuations of the results around the average. Such fluctuations are observed and measured in two dimensions for each type of auction: as the number of auctions grows and as the number of bidders increases. en
dc.publisher Hindawi Publishing Corporation en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/1173-9126/ en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ en
dc.title A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.subject.marsden Fields of Research::230000 Mathematical Sciences::230100 Mathematics en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1155/JAMDS/2006/27417 en
pubs.issue 27417 en
pubs.begin-page 14 pages en
pubs.volume 2006 en
dc.description.version VoR - Version of Record en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: Hindawi Publishing Corporation en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess en

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