Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions

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dc.contributor.author Pan, S en
dc.contributor.author Fabrizi, Simona en
dc.contributor.author Lippert, Steffen en
dc.contributor.editor Bonanno, G en
dc.contributor.editor van der Hoek, W en
dc.contributor.editor Perea, A en
dc.date.accessioned 2018-10-26T03:00:12Z en
dc.date.issued 2018-05-19 en
dc.identifier.citation The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 0(0) 19 May 2018 en
dc.identifier.issn 1935-1704 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/43554 en
dc.description.abstract We relax the standard assumptions in collective decision-making models that voters can not only derive a perfect view about the accuracy of the information at their disposal before casting their votes, but can, in addition, also correctly assess other voters’ views about it. We assume that decision-makers hold potentially differing views, while remaining ignorant about such differences, if any. In this setting, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher-quality decisions, including in the canonical 12 jurors case. We obtain voting equilibria with many instances, in which other voting rules, including unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority. en
dc.publisher De Gruyter en
dc.relation.ispartofseries BE Journal of Theoretical Economics en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights The published source must be acknowledged and a link to the journal home page or articles' DOI must be set. en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.rights.uri https://www.degruyter.com/dg/page/repository-policy en
dc.title Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1515/bejte-2016-0185 en
pubs.issue 2 en
pubs.volume 18 en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The authors en
pubs.edition Special Section on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT12) en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 741428 en
pubs.org-id Business and Economics en
pubs.org-id Economics en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2018-05-28 en
pubs.online-publication-date 2018-05-19 en


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