dc.contributor.author |
Pan, S |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Fabrizi, Simona |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Lippert, Steffen |
en |
dc.contributor.editor |
Bonanno, G |
en |
dc.contributor.editor |
van der Hoek, W |
en |
dc.contributor.editor |
Perea, A |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2018-10-26T03:00:12Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2018-05-19 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 0(0) 19 May 2018 |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
1935-1704 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/43554 |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
We relax the standard assumptions in collective decision-making models that voters can not only derive a perfect view about the accuracy of the information at their disposal before casting their votes, but can, in addition, also correctly assess other voters’ views about it. We assume that decision-makers hold potentially differing views, while remaining ignorant about such differences, if any. In this setting, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher-quality decisions, including in the canonical 12 jurors case. We obtain voting equilibria with many instances, in which other voting rules, including unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority. |
en |
dc.publisher |
De Gruyter |
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dc.relation.ispartofseries |
BE Journal of Theoretical Economics |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. |
en |
dc.rights |
The published source must be acknowledged and a link to the journal home page or articles' DOI must be set. |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://www.degruyter.com/dg/page/repository-policy |
en |
dc.title |
Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions |
en |
dc.type |
Journal Article |
en |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1515/bejte-2016-0185 |
en |
pubs.issue |
2 |
en |
pubs.volume |
18 |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: The authors |
en |
pubs.edition |
Special Section on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT12) |
en |
dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess |
en |
pubs.subtype |
Article |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
741428 |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Business and Economics |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Economics |
en |
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2018-05-28 |
en |
pubs.online-publication-date |
2018-05-19 |
en |