dc.contributor.author |
Julien, Benoit |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Kennes, John |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
King, Ian |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2009-06-25T00:27:45Z |
en |
dc.date.available |
2009-06-25T00:27:45Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2001 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 1 (1), art1. 2001 |
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dc.identifier.issn |
1534-5998 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/4454 |
en |
dc.description |
An open access copy of this article is available and complies with the copyright holder/publisher conditions. |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
We compare equilibrium allocations in directed search models where prices are determined
alternatively by posting and by competing auctions, with the following results. With finite numbers
of players, sellers’ expected payoffs are higher when all sellers auction than when all sellers post.
This difference is largest in the 2-by-2 case, where payoffs to sellers are 1/3 higher if they auction.
The difference in the payoffs decreases rapidly with market size and vanishes in the limit “large”
economy. When sellers can choose whether to post prices or auction in the 2-by-2- case, all
combinations (auction-auction, post-post, and auction-post) can occur in equilibrium if sellers
choose mechanism and price simultaneously. However, if sellers choose mechanism before price
then the dominant strategy equilibrium has both sellers auctioning. |
en |
dc.publisher |
Berkeley Electronic Press |
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dc.relation.ispartofseries |
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/1935-1690/ |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.source.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1534-5998.1024 |
en |
dc.title |
Auctions and Posted Prices in Directed Search Equilibrium |
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dc.type |
Journal Article |
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dc.subject.marsden |
Fields of Research::340000 Economics |
en |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.2202/1534-5998.1024 |
en |
pubs.issue |
1 |
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pubs.begin-page |
art1 |
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pubs.volume |
1 |
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dc.description.version |
VoR - Version of Record |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: The Berkeley Electronic Press |
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dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess |
en |