Initial public offering prospectus forecast errors and mandatory explanations: evidence from New Zealand

Abstract

This paper examines management forecast errors in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses of New Zealand firms and subsequent management explanations for earnings forecast errors in recent years. New Zealand has several unique features and recent changes that are worthy of research, including the requirement for management to make forecasts; a requirement to explain differences between forecast and actual; and a recent change that provides the voluntary opportunity to obtain a negative assurance opinion on forecasts. Using hand-collected IPO data between 1998 and 2014, we find that firms that include a negative assurance opinion on the prospective financial information in the prospectus have more accurate earnings and cash flow forecasts. We investigate the subsequent explanations for forecast errors, which are mandated by a financial reporting standard. We show that management tends to attribute negative and large forecast errors to external causes rather than their own actions. Our findings have implications for regulators and investors in New Zealand and other settings.