Real Earnings Management around CEO Turnovers

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Show simple item record Geertsema, Paul en Lont, DH en Lu, Helen en 2019-05-27T01:53:51Z en 2015-12-07 en
dc.identifier.citation 07 Dec 2015. SSRN. 44 pages en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract Following a change in CEO, US firms manage earnings downward by adjusting real business activities and accruals. The decision of new-CEO firms to give earnings a “bath” is influenced by CEO compensation, institutional investor concentration, analyst following and capital structure. The choice of real versus accrual-based earnings management strategies depends on the firm’s ability to use an accrual-based bath. These earnings “baths” are more pronounced after external CEO successions. en
dc.relation.ispartof SSRN en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Real Earnings Management around CEO Turnovers en
dc.type Report en
dc.identifier.doi 10.2139/ssrn.2700050 en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The authors en en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Working Paper en
pubs.elements-id 505875 en
dc.relation.isnodouble 1247175 * Business and Economics en Accounting and Finance en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2015-11-22 en

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