dc.contributor.author |
Elkind, E |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Grandi, U |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Rossi, F |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Slinko, Arkadii |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2019-09-12T22:20:05Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2017-07-26 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
Arxiv (1707.08598v1). 26 Jul 2017. 27 pages |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/47663 |
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dc.description.abstract |
By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters can change the election outcome in their favour by unilaterally modifying their vote. When a given election admits several such voters, strategic voting becomes a game among potential manipulators: a manipulative vote that leads to a better outcome when other voters are truthful may lead to disastrous results when other voters choose to manipulate as well. We consider this situation from the perspective of a boundedly rational voter, and use the cognitive hierarchy framework to identify good strategies. We then investigate the associated algorithmic questions under the k-approval voting rule. We obtain positive algorithmic results for k=1 and 2, and NP- and coNP-hardness results for k>3. |
en |
dc.relation.ispartof |
Arxiv |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/license.html |
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dc.subject |
cs.GT |
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dc.subject |
cs.GT |
en |
dc.title |
Cognitive Hierarchy and Voting Manipulation |
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dc.type |
Report |
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dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: The authors |
en |
pubs.author-url |
http://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08598v1 |
en |
dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess |
en |
pubs.subtype |
Working Paper |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
642342 |
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pubs.org-id |
Science |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Mathematics |
en |
pubs.arxiv-id |
1707.08598 |
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pubs.number |
1707.08598v1 |
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pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2019-09-23 |
en |