dc.contributor.author |
Desmedt, Y |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Slinko, Arkadii |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2019-09-12T22:20:29Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2019-08-20 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
Arxiv (1908.07581v1). 20 Aug 2019. 12 pages |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/47669 |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
The study of Rational Secret Sharing initiated by Halpern and Teague regards the reconstruction of the secret in secret sharing as a game. It was shown that participants (parties) may refuse to reveal their shares and so the reconstruction may fail. Moreover, a refusal to reveal the share may be a dominant strategy of a party. In this paper we consider secret sharing as a sub-action or subgame of a larger action/game where the secret opens a possibility of consumption of a certain common good. We claim that utilities of participants will be dependent on the nature of this common good. In particular, Halpern and Teague scenario corresponds to a rivalrous and excludable common good. We consider the case when this common good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable and find many natural Nash equilibria. We list several applications of secret sharing to demonstrate our claim and give corresponding scenarios. In such circumstances the secret sharing scheme facilitates a power sharing agreement in the society. We also state that non-reconstruction may be beneficial for this society and give several examples. |
en |
dc.relation.ispartof |
Arxiv |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/license.html |
en |
dc.subject |
cs.CR |
en |
dc.subject |
cs.CR |
en |
dc.subject |
econ.TH |
en |
dc.title |
Realistic versus Rational Secret Sharing |
en |
dc.type |
Report |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: The authors |
en |
pubs.author-url |
http://arxiv.org/abs/1908.07581v1 |
en |
dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess |
en |
pubs.subtype |
Working Paper |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
779691 |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Science |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Mathematics |
en |
pubs.arxiv-id |
1908.07581 |
en |
pubs.number |
1908.07581v1 |
en |
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2019-09-23 |
en |