Beyond Electing and Ranking: Collective Dominating Chains, Dominating Subsets and Dichotomies

ResearchSpace/Manakin Repository

Show simple item record Lang, J en Monnot, J en Slinko, Arkadii en Zwicker, WS en
dc.coverage.spatial Sao Paulo, Brazil en 2019-09-19T03:48:11Z en 2017 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract Classical voting rules output a winning alternative (or a nonempty set of tied alternatives). Social welfare functions output a ranking over alternatives. There are many practical situations where we have to output a different structure than a winner or a ranking: for instance, a ranked or non-ranked set of $k$ winning alternatives, or an ordered partition of alternatives. We define three classes of such aggregation functions, whose output can have any structure we want; we focus on aggregation functions that output dominating chains, dominating subsets, and dichotomies. We address the computation of our rules, and start studying their normative properties by focusing on a generalisation of Condorcet-consistency. en
dc.publisher ACM en
dc.relation.ispartof 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) en
dc.relation.ispartofseries AAMAS '17 Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject Science & Technology en
dc.subject Technology en
dc.subject Automation & Control Systems en
dc.subject Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence en
dc.subject Engineering, Electrical & Electronic en
dc.subject Robotics en
dc.subject Computer Science en
dc.subject Engineering en
dc.subject AGGREGATION en
dc.subject CRITERION en
dc.subject RULES en
dc.title Beyond Electing and Ranking: Collective Dominating Chains, Dominating Subsets and Dichotomies en
dc.type Conference Item en
pubs.begin-page 24 en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en en
pubs.end-page 32 en
pubs.finish-date 2017-05-12 en
pubs.publication-status Published en
pubs.start-date 2017-05-08 en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Proceedings en
pubs.elements-id 735851 en Science en Mathematics en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2019-10-08 en

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