Justifying and excusing sex

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dc.contributor.author Wall, Jesse en
dc.date.accessioned 2019-11-03T21:45:27Z en
dc.date.issued 2019-06 en
dc.identifier.issn 1871-9791 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/48800 en
dc.description.abstract This article aligns two complementary claims: that sexual penetration (itself) should be considered a wrong and that consent requires express words and conduct that manifest a person’s willingness or acquiescence towards the spe- cific act. If sexual penetration is a wrong, it will only be justified if there are rea- sons that permit the action (‘guiding reasons’) and if these were the ones that the defendant acted on (‘explanatory reasons’). A person’s internal attitude of will- ingness or acquiescence (his or her ‘attitudinal consent’) towards the specific act can provide the necessary guiding reasons to justify the wrong. However, words and conduct that manifest or express this internal attitude (‘expressive consent’) are also needed in order to provide the applicable explanatory reasons to justify the wrong. Alternatively, expressive consent can excuse the wrong by justifying the defendant’s mistake as to the applicable guiding reasons. Without the require- ment of expressive consent, the criminal law is unable to capture the culpability of defendants whose deliberation over the use of force on another person (to achieve penetration) did not include the other person’s expression of willingness to engage in a penetrative sexual act. en
dc.description.uri https://catalogue.library.auckland.ac.nz/permalink/f/t37c0t/uoa_alma51219826320002091 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Criminal Law and Philosophy en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.title Justifying and excusing sex en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s11572-018-9470-0 en
pubs.issue 2 en
pubs.begin-page 283 en
pubs.volume 13 en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en
pubs.author-url https://link.springer.com/journal/11572/13/2 en
pubs.end-page 307 en
pubs.publication-status Published online en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 783572 en
pubs.org-id Law en
pubs.org-id Faculty Administration Law en
dc.identifier.eissn 1871-9805 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2019-10-11 en
pubs.online-publication-date 2018-05-31 en

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