dc.contributor.author |
Slinko, Arkadii |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
White, Shaun |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2009-08-28T03:20:20Z |
en |
dc.date.available |
2009-08-28T03:20:20Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2008-07 |
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dc.identifier.citation |
Department of Mathematics - Research Reports-563 (2008) |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
1173-0889 |
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dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/4965 |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
We extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in the following way. We prove that an onto, non-dictatorial social choice rule which is employed to choose one of at least three alternatives is safely manipulable. This means that on occasion a voter will have an incentive to make a strategic vote and know that he will not be worse off regardless of how other voters with similar preference orders would vote, sincerely or not. |
en |
dc.publisher |
Department of Mathematics, The University of Auckland, New Zealand |
en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Research Reports - Department of Mathematics |
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dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.source.uri |
http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/Research/Reports/view.php?id=563 |
en |
dc.title |
Is It Ever Safe to Vote Strategically? |
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dc.type |
Technical Report |
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dc.subject.marsden |
Fields of Research::230000 Mathematical Sciences::230100 Mathematics |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
The author(s) |
en |