On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules

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On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules

Slinko, Arkadii
Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/2292/4970
Issue Date: 2000-10
Reference: Department of Mathematics - Research Reports-458 (2000)
Rights: The author(s)
Rights (URI): https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm

Abstract:

We show that, when the number of voters $n$ tends to infinity, all classical social choice rules are asymptotically strategy-proof with the proportion of manipulable profiles being of order $O(1/sqrt{n})$.

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Related URL: http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/Research/Reports/view.php?id=458

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