On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules
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On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules
Slinko, Arkadii
Identifier:
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/4970
Issue Date:
2000-10
Reference:
Department of Mathematics - Research Reports-458 (2000)
Rights:
The author(s)
Rights (URI):
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm
Abstract:
We show that, when the number of voters $n$ tends to infinity, all classical social choice rules are asymptotically strategy-proof with the proportion of manipulable profiles being of order $O(1/sqrt{n})$.
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http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/Research/Reports/view.php?id=458
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
Department of Mathematics - Research Reports Archive (1996-2008)
[201]
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