dc.contributor.author |
Slinko, Arkadii |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2009-08-28T03:23:05Z |
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dc.date.available |
2009-08-28T03:23:05Z |
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dc.date.issued |
2002-06 |
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dc.identifier.citation |
Department of Mathematics - Research Reports-484 (2002) |
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dc.identifier.issn |
1173-0889 |
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dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/5143 |
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dc.description.abstract |
We study the class of scoring rules and multistage elimination rules under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption. We show that, when the number of participating agents n tends to infinity, the proportion of the number of voting situations manipulable by a coalition of k voters to all voting situations is smaller than Ck/n, where C is the constant which depends only on the number of alternatives but not on k and n. |
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dc.publisher |
Department of Mathematics, The University of Auckland, New Zealand |
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dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Research Reports - Department of Mathematics |
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dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.source.uri |
http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/Research/Reports/view.php?id=484 |
en |
dc.title |
On Asymptotic Coalitional Strategy-Proofness of Social Choice Rules under the IAC Assumptoin |
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dc.type |
Technical Report |
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dc.subject.marsden |
Fields of Research::230000 Mathematical Sciences::230100 Mathematics |
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dc.rights.holder |
The author(s) |
en |