Real Time Pricing and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets

Show simple item record Poletti SJ en Wright J en 2020-10-16T00:52:06Z 2020-10-16T00:52:06Z 2020-3 en
dc.identifier.issn 1467-6451 en
dc.description.abstract We analyze the effects of the adoption of real‐time pricing (RTP) of electricity when generating firms have market power. We find that an increase in consumers on RTP contracts decreases peak prices and increases off‐peak prices, increases consumer surplus (both for switching and non‐switching consumers) and welfare, while decreasing industry profits, with these effects being magnified by the extent of market power. We illustrate these results by calibrating our model to the New Zealand electricity market, and find that taking into account the market power of generating firms increases the efficiency gains from RTP adoption by 41%. en
dc.publisher Wiley en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Journal of Industrial Economics en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject 1402 Applied Economics en
dc.title Real Time Pricing and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/joie.12215. en
pubs.issue Vol. 68 Issue 1, p93-135 en
pubs.begin-page 93 en
pubs.volume Vol. 68 en 2020-09-23T02:16:36Z en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en en
pubs.end-page 135 en
pubs.publisher-url en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 816767 en
dc.identifier.eissn 1467-6451 en 2020-1-1 en

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