The Anticompetitive Potential of Cross-Market Mergers in Healthcare

ResearchSpace Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author King JS
dc.contributor.author Fuse Brown EC
dc.date.accessioned 2020-11-18T22:46:25Z
dc.date.available 2020-11-18T22:46:25Z
dc.date.issued 2017
dc.identifier.citation St. Louis Journal of Health Law and Policy 11:44-44 2017
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/53642
dc.description.abstract Health care consolidation in the United States has been widespread at all levels and across all entities. This consolidation has extended beyond horizontal mergers of hospitals or other providers to include out-of-market mergers, or cross-market mergers. Cross-market mergers include the merger or acquisition of any health care entity that does not directly compete with the acquiring entity in the same product or geographic market. Antitrust enforcers have historically had little in the way of market theory, economic models, or empirical data to inform their analyses on the potential impacts of cross-market mergers on competition. However, recent developments in economic theory and empirical studies now offer evidence that cross-market mergers can, in some instances, harm competition and drive price increases in health care markets when a common insurer exists across those markets. This article aims to start a discussion among the health policy and antitrust communities about the potential for cross-market acquisitions to harm competition, whether existing antitrust laws could theoretically support a challenge to a cross-market acquisition, and the practical challenges to doing so. This article will argue that health policy analysts, antitrust enforcers, and academics should begin to consider the anti-competitive potential of cross-market acquisitions and develop a means to analyze them both legally and economically.
dc.relation.ispartofseries St. Louis Journal of Health Law and Policy
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm
dc.title The Anticompetitive Potential of Cross-Market Mergers in Healthcare
dc.type Journal Article
pubs.begin-page 44
pubs.volume 11
dc.date.updated 2020-10-15T00:27:39Z
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en
pubs.author-url https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp/vol11/iss1/5/
pubs.end-page 44
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess en
pubs.subtype Article
pubs.elements-id 818131


Files in this item

Find Full text

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Share

Search ResearchSpace


Advanced Search

Browse

Statistics