Emotion and Moral Judgment; Moral Unanimity and Diversity

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dc.contributor.advisor Mulgan, Tim
dc.contributor.advisor Pettigrove, Glen
dc.contributor.author Tan, Mark
dc.date.accessioned 2021-01-13T19:56:25Z
dc.date.available 2021-01-13T19:56:25Z
dc.date.issued 2020 en
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/2292/54205
dc.description.abstract There are instances of moral unanimity. There are also instances of moral diversity. I argue that emotion-based accounts of moral judgment can plausibly explain such instances (and this counts as a reason in favour of such accounts). I also argue that such accounts can best a rival conventionalist account in at least one respect in explaining (instances of) moral unanimity and diversity. I make these arguments with the aim of prompting ‘fence-sitters’ to side with such emotion-based accounts of moral judgments.
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartof PhD Thesis - University of Auckland en
dc.relation.isreferencedby UoA en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/nz/
dc.title Emotion and Moral Judgment; Moral Unanimity and Diversity
dc.type Thesis en
thesis.degree.discipline Philosophy
thesis.degree.grantor The University of Auckland en
thesis.degree.level Doctoral en
thesis.degree.name PhD en
dc.date.updated 2021-01-01T23:56:23Z
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess en


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