The role of international anti-corruption regulations in promoting socially responsible practices

Show simple item record Jandhyala, Srividya Oliveira, Fernando S 2021-10-05T04:38:17Z 2021-10-05T04:38:17Z 2021-10-1
dc.identifier.issn 0167-2681
dc.description.abstract We analyze how international anti-corruption rules impact the behavior of multinational firms in promoting sustainable practices. Competition from multinational firms is expected to lower bribe rents and hence corruption in host countries. However, we argue that the competition between domestic and multinational firms is unequal as (only) the latter face greater monitoring and sanction through international anti-corruption regulations. We develop a game theoretic model of bribing to examine the strategic response of firms under conditions of unequal competition. We show that under certain conditions the bribing probability of domestic firms increases when multinational firms facing greater penalties refrain from bribing. We use an agent-based simulation to analyze industries with heterogeneous firms, showing that the optimal strategies converge to the Nash equilibrium, and identify the major drivers of profitability and bribing.
dc.language en
dc.publisher Elsevier BV
dc.relation.ispartofseries Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.
dc.subject 1401 Economic Theory
dc.subject 1402 Applied Economics
dc.subject 1403 Econometrics
dc.title The role of international anti-corruption regulations in promoting socially responsible practices
dc.type Journal Article
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.017
pubs.begin-page 15
pubs.volume 190 2021-09-09T05:55:24Z
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en
pubs.end-page 32
pubs.publication-status Accepted
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Journal Article
pubs.elements-id 863888

Files in this item

Find Full text

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record


Search ResearchSpace