Abstract:
With the rise of logical positivism the idea that scientific knowledge is
objective and testable became widespread. Successfully challenging assumptions
fundamental to the positivists' standpoint, Popper's famous critique nevertheless
endorsed their views that there existed a method unique to scientific inquiry, adherence
to which made objective knowledge possible. This alleged objectivity has been
seriously challenged in recent discussions concerning the history and philosophy of
science. Kuhn and Feyerabend are two philosophers who have spearheaded this
movement. Focusing attention mainly on revolutionary developments in the history of
science, these two philosophers have forcefully argued that such revolutions were only
possible given the existence of subjective determinants.
This essay begins with a brief characterization of positivistic philosophy of
science and the views of Popper. Following the claim that subjectivist elements enter
into Popper's epistemology, attention is directed to the presentation of the explicitly
subjectivistic philosophies of science of Kuhn and Feyerabend.
The relevance of these recent philosophic developments for the place of theory in psychology is demonstrated within the context of a critique of B.F. Skinner's
behaviouristic approach to psychology.
Failing to appreciate the critical importance of subjectivist elements in the
development of science, scientists in general still cling to positivistic and Popperian
views. Social psychologists, still holding objectivist views, are amongst those who
consider that the behaviour of the scientist qua scientist lies outside their domain of inquiry. Consequently, social psychologists are not forthcoming with the requisite
psychological theories considered by philosophers such as Kuhn and Feyerabend to be
necessary to account for scientific change.
While emphasizing the role of subjective factors as determinants of scientific
change, Kuhn and Feyerabend have nevertheless failed to suggest a theory accounting
for such change in terms of these subjective factors. To rectify this state of affairs a
socio-psychological theory of scientific change is proposed. The development of a
socio-psychological understanding of the nature and function of scientific theory
constitutes an integral part of this programme. In terms of these ideas an attempt is
made to identify possible socio-psychological antecedents of scientific change.