Group Agency and Biological Individuality

Abstract

This thesis explores the possibility that the topic of group agency (in moral and political philosophy) and the topic of biological individuality (in the philosophy of biology) can be mutually informative. I argue that ideas and perspectives germane to one topic might be theoretically useful when taken up in the context of the other. There is a natural perspective we take towards humans and human groups, that if applied to our theorizing about biological individuals, allows us to give fuller explanations and descriptions of certain cases in which philosophers of biology have taken an interest (such as those in which individuals at different hierarchical levels exhibit individuality to a degree). Conversely, there is a pluralistic approach commonly taken toward biological individuality that, if applied to cases of group agency, suggests a useful, more nuanced taxonomy that distinguishes different kinds of agents or degrees of agency. Beyond what is argued in detail, I have made efforts to raise a number of related questions and problems, outlining them for future work in this interesting novel intersection of subfields.