dc.contributor.author |
Benischke, Mirko H |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Martin, Geoffrey P |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Gomez‐Mejia, Luis R |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Ljubownikow, Grigorij |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2022-06-23T04:41:32Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2022-06-23T04:41:32Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2020-02-11 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
(2020). Human Resource Management, 59(5), 463-482. |
|
dc.identifier.issn |
0090-4848 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/2292/60124 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
CEO incentives have been the subject of great interest for human resource scholars. We explore the institutional context within which the CEO makes sense of their incentives. Our theory suggests that CEO equity incentives interact with institutional norms to influence foreign market entry choices. Specifically, we argue that CEOs will weigh the risk bearing created by equity incentives, along with the consequences of legitimacy loss, when deciding whether to deviate from institutional norms when internationalizing. In doing so, we advance human resource literature by demonstrating that CEO responses to incentives are influenced by institutional norms and that CEOs' decisions to deviate from institutional norms are shaped by their incentives. We find support for our framework in the analysis of the stake taken by acquirers in 4,184 cross-border acquisitions. |
|
dc.language |
en |
|
dc.publisher |
Wiley |
|
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Human Resource Management |
|
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. |
|
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
|
dc.subject |
Clinical Research |
|
dc.subject |
Social Sciences |
|
dc.subject |
Psychology, Applied |
|
dc.subject |
Management |
|
dc.subject |
Psychology |
|
dc.subject |
Business & Economics |
|
dc.subject |
agency theory |
|
dc.subject |
CEO compensation |
|
dc.subject |
compensation and benefits |
|
dc.subject |
institutional theory |
|
dc.subject |
ENTRY MODE CHOICE |
|
dc.subject |
EARLY INTERNATIONALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
COMPENSATION DESIGN |
|
dc.subject |
CULTURAL TIGHTNESS |
|
dc.subject |
FIRM PERFORMANCE |
|
dc.subject |
UPPER ECHELONS |
|
dc.subject |
STOCK-OPTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
MORAL HAZARD |
|
dc.subject |
RISK-TAKING |
|
dc.subject |
OWNERSHIP |
|
dc.subject |
1503 Business and Management |
|
dc.title |
The effect of CEO incentives on deviations from institutional norms in foreign market expansion decisions: Behavioral agency and cross‐border acquisitions |
|
dc.type |
Journal Article |
|
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1002/hrm.22006 |
|
pubs.issue |
5 |
|
pubs.begin-page |
463 |
|
pubs.volume |
59 |
|
dc.date.updated |
2022-05-02T00:25:27Z |
|
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: The author |
en |
pubs.author-url |
http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000512450400001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=6e41486220adb198d0efde5a3b153e7d |
|
pubs.end-page |
482 |
|
pubs.publication-status |
Published online |
|
dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess |
en |
pubs.subtype |
Article |
|
pubs.subtype |
Journal |
|
pubs.elements-id |
802212 |
|
pubs.org-id |
Business and Economics |
|
pubs.org-id |
Management & Intl Business |
|
dc.identifier.eissn |
1099-050X |
|
pubs.number |
hrm.22006 |
|
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2022-05-02 |
|
pubs.online-publication-date |
2020-02-11 |
|