Understanding Contemporary Chinese State Nationalism: The Relevance of the Pragmatic Nationalism Paradigm

Abstract

Prior to 2009, one of the more prominent views within international relations scholarship on the connections between Chinese nationalism and foreign policy was that of Suisheng Zhao’s pragmatic nationalism. This paradigm argued that after Tiananmen the dominant variety of nationalism at the state level was characterised by pragmatism, instrumentalism, statism, and a reactive foreign policy. Yet while many scholars agreed with some or all of these assumptions, the paradigm was never subjected to standardised theory-testing across the full period of its assumed relevancy. Furthermore, from 2009 onward, new concerns arose within international relations scholarship that China was exhibiting both increased aggression and rising nationalism, leading to the need for re-examination of the previous assumptions on its behaviour. This thesis addresses these needs by performing the first systematic theory testing of pragmatic nationalism, covering five Chinese presidential terms from 1993 to 2018. The research employs a comparative case study approach, examining five cases of a single presidential term each, across the Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping administrations. It then evaluates the primary claims of pragmatic nationalism using standardised criteria in both within-case and cross-case analysis, in order to understand the accuracy of the paradigm over time. Furthermore, it uses this testing of pragmatic nationalism to generate new insights relevant to key points of debate within the wider scholarship. The findings resulting from this analysis support the majority of claims made by pragmatic nationalism during the 1990s and 2000s, but they suggest that the paradigm is no longer supported as accurate during the 2010s. While a calculation of interests remains supported as the primary motivation behind China’s foreign policy, the paradigm did not prove accurate in its predictions on China’s behaviour and lacked a consideration of ideational factors. Finally, this research confirms the concerns that a shift in behaviour occurred after 2009, and it finds that further changes have occurred in the first term of Xi Jinping. These results underlie the need for further re-examination and research on this topic within the wider scholarship, as well as providing insights for current expectations on China’s foreign policy.