dc.contributor.author |
Karabay, Bilgehan |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Pulverer, G |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Weinmüller, E |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2011-02-03T02:31:04Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2009 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
COMPUT ECON 33(4):361-388 May 2009 |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
0927-7099 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/6314 |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
In this paper, we analyze the reason behind the use of foreign ownership restrictions on inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). We extend the results developed in Karabay (2005) by changing the condition on share distribution in the model. Due to this change, we are able to analyze the political economy aspect of this restrictive policy, i.e., we can study the effect of the host government,s welfare preference on the optimal foreign ownership restriction. Since the analytical solution to the optimal share restriction policy cannot be specified in general, we use a numerical approach based on collocation to approximate the solution to the problem. Within this framework, under certain conditions, it turns out that the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off is sharper the less the host government favors the local firm. We show that not only economic factors but also political factors play an important role in the determination of the foreign ownership restrictions. |
en |
dc.description.uri |
http://www.springerlink.com/content/qx4322325554u4xp/ |
en |
dc.language |
EN |
en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Computational Economics |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0927-7099/ |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
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dc.subject |
Ownership |
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dc.subject |
Multinationals |
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dc.subject |
Asymmetric information |
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dc.subject |
Regulation |
en |
dc.subject |
Singular boundary value problems in ODEs |
en |
dc.subject |
Collocation methods |
en |
dc.subject |
BOUNDARY-VALUE-PROBLEMS |
en |
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES |
en |
dc.subject |
COLLOCATION METHODS |
en |
dc.subject |
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY |
en |
dc.subject |
DIFFERENTIAL-EQUATIONS |
en |
dc.subject |
DIRECT-INVESTMENT |
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dc.subject |
PERFORMANCE |
en |
dc.subject |
SPILLOVERS |
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dc.subject |
2ND-ORDER |
en |
dc.subject |
RIGHTS |
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dc.title |
Foreign Ownership Restrictions: A Numerical Approach |
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dc.type |
Journal Article |
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dc.identifier.doi |
10.1007/s10614-008-9163-1 |
en |
pubs.issue |
4 |
en |
pubs.begin-page |
361 |
en |
pubs.volume |
33 |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: Springer Verlag |
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pubs.end-page |
388 |
en |
dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess |
en |
pubs.subtype |
Article |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
89216 |
en |
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2010-09-01 |
en |