Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

Chaudhuri, AnanishSchotter, ASopher, B2012-03-072009Economic Journal 119(534):91-122 20090013-0133http://hdl.handle.net/2292/13330We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the ‘Minimum Effort Game’ which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge.Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0013-0133/https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htmTalking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of AdviceJournal Article10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02207.xCopyright: Royal Economic Society; The Author; Blackwell Publishinghttp://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess