Brookbanks, Warren2012-03-042008New Zealand Law Review 2008(Part 4):623-637 20081173-5864http://hdl.handle.net/2292/12678This article examines claims that cognitive neuroscience challenges the theoretical andpractical efficacy ofthe notions offree will and criminal responsibility and threatens to dominate the entire legal system. The notion of'folk psychology" - popular explanations of behaviour ofwhich criminal responsibility and its analogues may be a manifestation - is considered in light ofthe challenges posed by eliminative materialism anddeterministic neuroscience. The question that is posed is whether the concept ofcriminal responsibility will be able to withstand the imperious advances of modern science inherent in cognitive neuroscience and other reductionist accounts ofhuman behaviour. The article concludes that, while neuroscience technology may impact the way in which certain evidence is led in criminal trials, it is unlikely (at leastfor the foreseeable future) that neuroscience will undermine the libertarian concept offree will on which the retributivist system of criminal law depends.Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htmJournal ArticleCopyright: Legal Research Foundationhttp://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess