Pettigrove, Glen2014-11-252006Journal of Social Philosophy, 2006, 37 (4), pp. 483 - 5000047-2786https://hdl.handle.net/2292/23578The paper explores the possibility of collectives forgiving and being forgiven. The first half of the paper articulates and amends Hannah Arendt’s account of forgiveness of and by individuals. The second half raises several objections to the possibility of extending this account to forgiveness of and by collectives. In reply, I argue that collectives can have emotions, be guilty, and meet other necessary conditions for forgiving or being forgiven. However, I explain why, even though collective forgiveness is possible, it may, nonetheless, prove dissatisfying.Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0047-2786/https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htmJournal Article10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00353.xhttp://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess1467-9833