Calude, CSPoznanovic, N2015-01-052015-01-052014CDMTCS Research Reports CDMTCS-461 (2014)1178-3540http://hdl.handle.net/2292/23894It is frequently claimed that randomness conflicts with free will because “[i]f our actions are caused by chance we lack control” and “[r]andomness, the operation of mere chance, clearly excludes control”. In this paper we challenge this position. To this aim we propose a simple, two-stage, contextual (not absolute) definition of free will and we show that, relative to this definition, randomness is not incompatible with free will. Crucial for our argument is the fact that there are no random events in nature. Randomness is only a theoretical concept which is defined and produced in deterministic ways: it is not a direct cause of actions. Our analysis is relative: it does not provide a proof for the existence nor impossibility of free will.Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htmTechnical ReportFields of ResearchThe author(s)http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess