Davies, SKroon, FWilson, Daniel2015-10-2820152015http://hdl.handle.net/2292/27328The goal of this research project is to provide a theoretical framework for understanding artistic practices. I argue that the theory of art that I develop can ground both a theory of artistic value and a definition of art in the classificatory sense. I defend an “artistic functionalist” definition of art. By this I mean that artworks function to reward a particular way of attending to the artefacts that I label “the artistic attentional strategy.” This formulation allows for a measure of the functional value of artworks that I call its “core artistic value.” This, I claim, is its value as art. My methodology involves adapting John Searle’s theory of social facts for the purposes of examining artistic practices. I argue for a method of analysing social practices that provides several levels of description. I characterise behavioural patterns that are common to artistic behaviours—namely, the artistic attentional strategy. I also develop a theory of artefacts that can accommodate the ontological variety required of artworks (i.e., including items of both intangible and material culture), as well as the transgressive nature of some artworks. Artistic practices are those that involve the creation of artefacts that function to reward artistic appreciation (either as a proper function of the artefact or as incidental to its proper function). In some of these practices, institutions are created where these artefacts are produced and promoted and where the primary function of rewarding the artistic attentional strategy is esteemed. These are the high art practices. This framework allows for the examination of artistic practices in different cultures at specific levels—artistic behaviours, artistic practices, and high art institutions. I argue that my framework can be used to explain multiple artistic senses in which the term “art” is used. Further, my functional account of artworks also provides a basis for an account of artistic value—the value of an artwork as art. I also show that my definition is adequate by testing it against various sets of desiderata for a definition of art.Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htmhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/nz/ThesisCopyright: The Authorhttp://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccessQ112262509