A Cooperative Game Approach to Patent Litigation, Settlement, and Allocation of Legal Costs

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dc.contributor.author Aoki, Reiko en
dc.contributor.author Hu, Jin en
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-30T20:53:46Z en
dc.date.available 2006-11-30T20:53:46Z en
dc.date.issued 1999 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 186 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/216 en
dc.description.abstract We analyze litigation and settlement behavior in case of patent infringement using the Nash Bargaining Game framework. We show that litigation can be the Pareto efficient outcome. We also show that when there is settlement, the transfer payment from the defendant to the plaintiff is increasing in its own legal cost and decreasing in that of the plaintiff, reflecting the bargaining power on both sides. We also compare the American and English rules of cost allocation when legal costs are endogenously determined. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title A Cooperative Game Approach to Patent Litigation, Settlement, and Allocation of Legal Costs en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en
pubs.org-id Economics en


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